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ABSTRACT
It has been argued that weaknesses inherent in Private Law rules, which contribute to its inability to 
effectively regulate  contracts,  are  in  part,  attributed  to  its  generality  as  well  as  inflexibility  in 
adapting to individual situations. Whilst self-regulation, a constituent of the standard setting system 
which private law supplements, offers advantages which include proximity (in that self regulatory 
organisations are considered closer to the industry being regulated), flexibility, and a high level of 
compliance with rules, it will be highlighted in this paper that some other models of regulation, are 
capable of conferring greater flexibility, compliance, enforcement and accountability.
The  setting  of  standards  with  „an  adequate  degree  of  specificity  in  order  to  provide  effective 
guidance, as well as the lack of expertise in choosing between standards are amongst some of the 
challenges which the Private Law of Contract is confronted with.
This paper aims to highlight and demonstrate why an interaction with public regulation, as well as 
an incorporation of substantive equality principles, will be required to address these weaknesses of 
Private Law. Further, it illustrates how through the evolvement of self regulation, and the interaction 
of self regulation with public regulation, Private Law has also evolved in its interaction with public 
regulation.
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Addressing the Inadequacies of Private Law in the Regulation of Contracts – 
During and Post Contract Formation Periods
Marianne Ojo1
Introduction
It is a widely acknowledged fact that Private Law techniques aimed at addressing regulation, in 
particular, social and economic regulation2, are flawed in their design.  This paper aims to identify, 
as well as address major flaws inherent in the design of Private Law regulatory techniques.
 In order to achieve this aim, the first section of the paper focuses on why contracts should be more 
effectively regulated, by way of reference to situations whereby the inequality of bargaining powers 
could arise, as well as emphasises the fact that such situations do not only arise during contract 
formation periods. 
Traditional  tools,  legal  and  equitable  doctrines  which  have  been  implemented  in  addressing 
situations whereby exploitation and unfairness in contract formation occur, will then be introduced 
and analysed. From this perspective, the role of courts in addressing the inadequacies of Private 
Law is not only highlighted, but also other considerations which should be taken into account by 
courts  in arriving at  decisions aimed at  ensuring that an equitable,  as well  as fair  settlement is 
achieved. 
In highlighting challenges presented to Private Law in its regulation of contracts, the third section 
of the paper will then consider how Private Law is evolving in its efforts to effectively regulate 
contracts and other more modern mechanisms and actors which are now involved the regulation of 
contracts. From this perpective, challenges presented to Private Law in the effective regulation of 
contracts,  will  be  considered  as  a  means  of  highlighting  why  greater  interaction  with  public 
regulation and other models of regulation is vital.
The fourth section will  then incorporate  a  discussion on the role  and contribution of courts  in 
achieving legal certainty. The role of Parliament in providing greater legal certainty, as well as the 
need for greater parliamentary powers where limits in the exercise of courts' discretionary powers 
occur, will be introduced in this respect. An analysis of the roles of the Ombudsman as well as other 
actors in fostering accountability, will also constitute the focus of attention in this section.
The fifth section highlights why harmonisation which is based on a common European Code of 
Ethics and Conduct, and which is founded on substantive equality principles may achieve greater 
and more effective results than the Draft Common Frame of Reference. The final and concluding 
section will then follow. 
To what  extent  should legal  certainty prevail  over flexibility and the ability to  offer  aggrieved 
parties the just and equitable results which they deserve? Should general rules which do not take 
into account the substance of transactions as well as individual peculiarities of a given situation take 
1 School of Social Sciences and Law, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford. Email: marianneojo@hotmail.com
2 „Such a search for more effective regulatory techniques in implementing economic and social regulation, has 
resulted in the creation of modern styles of public regulation.“ See H Collins, Regulating Contracts (1999) Oxford 
University Press at page 69
precedence over more bespoke and particularistic rules which would accord greater justice to the 
victim?
A. Why Should Contracts Be Regulated at All? 
If we lived in a perfect world, where ethical and moral principles were strictly observed, as well as 
the observation of one's conscious conscience, „the Golden Rule“3, „Do unto others as you would 
have  them do  unto  you“,  would  also  be  strictly  applied  –  without  the  need  for  any  external 
regulation. Further, given the reciprocal nature of numerous ethical and moral attributes, it would be 
expected that if both parties to a contract demonstrated and had mutual respect for one another, then 
the terms of a contract would mutually be respected.  In such a perfect scenario, Private Law would 
probably suffice in the regulation of contracts between two parties. However and unfortunately, we 
do not live in a perfect world and to compound this fact, the world in which we live is subjected to 
various  externalities  as  well  as  „surprises“  which  also  need  to  be  incorporated  and taken into 
account  when  designing  a  contract.  As  long  as  such  uncertainties  or  externalities  fall  within 
reasonable boundaries and within what is to be reasonably expected, then such factors should be 
considered in the event that a party decides to act in a manner contrary to the terms and spirit of the 
contract.
The above stated „Golden Rule“, which also accords with maxims4 of Equity, would also help in 
addressing situation where implied terms are incorporated into the contract. It is well acknowledged 
that traditions, cultures and norms differ across various jurisdictions. Whilst certain jurisdictions 
apply equitable principles – in  addition to legal contractual principles,  other jurisdictions apply 
other doctrines in approaching decisions related to implied terms in contracts. Irregardless of such 
differences, ethics and codes of conducts exist in every jurisdiction. In arriving at decisions which 
predominantly  involve  implied  terms,  and  in  every  jurisdiction,  the  application  of  substantive 
equality rules and principles  could constitute part of the basis on which the final decision is arrived.
Why Should Contracts Be More Effectively Regulated ?
An obvious answer to this would appear to be : Because parties to a contract, even though such 
parties are obliged under moral and ethical principles to uphold their side of the bargain, are human, 
and may be motivated by personal or self serving interests to act in a manner contrary to the spirit 
of the contract, after the contract has been entered into. Furthermore, a party to a contract may be 
induced  under  unfavourable  circumstances  to  enter  into  a  contract,  may  enter  into  a  „newly 
designed“ contract unknowingly – that is, further terms may be inserted into the contract after the 
contract  has  been entered into.  Such instances  could occur  for  example,  during the renewal  or 
extension of a contract. The party, having been accustomed to terms of the original contract, may 
assume that such terms also apply upon renewal, and by the time such change is brought to his/her 
notice,  it  is  probably too late  to withdraw from the contract  or to look for an alternative deal. 
Furthermore, „hidden terms“ may resurface in the form of extremely small and miscroscopic terms 
which have been inserted to the least conspicuous part of the contract.5
3 For further information on the reciprocity of moral and ethical values, see M Ojo, „Integrity, Respect for Others, and 
Ethics – Three Essential Leadership Qualities (April 2011). See also R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (2003) 
Oxford University Press at page 51
4 Amongst some of the more popular maxims which highlight the specificity of Equity, as well as its 
acknowledgement of the existence of common law , are:  
- He who Seeks Equity Must Do Equity
- He who Comes into Equity Must Come with Clean Hands
- Equity Follows the Law
- Equity Acts Specifically
- Equity Regards Substance Rather than Form
5 No one is excused from adequately and thoroughly reading through small prints of a contract. However certain 
In other situations, a party to a contract may be confronted with an offer during the duration of the 
contract – such an offer being made with the sole intention of exploiting the party's circumstances at 
the time. For example, the party making the offer may be aware of the „exploited“ party's situation 
or financial circumstances. To elaborate, the party being exploited has no other option (owing to his 
lower bargaining power or the influential position of the other party) and may lose the chance of 
improving professional and future prospects where such an offer is rejected or  turned down. The 
illustrated situations  reflect  the fact  that  contract  related issues in regulation do not only occur 
during the contract formation periods.
For this purpose, it  is  vital  to incorporate a form of „checks“ in the Private Law regulation of 
contracts.
„The standards set by Private Law comprise both mandatory standards and self regulation.“6 
Self regulation confers benefits which include flexibility, a high level of compliance with rules, and 
the contribution to the generation of rules which are tailor made and suitable for the industry being 
regulated. Whilst certain benefits emanate from self regulation, one of its greatest weaknesses lies 
in the level of accountability which it is able to foster.7  Further, in terms of flexibility, compliance, 
enforcement  and  accountability,  a  model  such  as  that  based  on  Enforced  Self  Regulation  is 
considered to confer greater benefits than self regulation.
Ayres and Braithwaite infer that the greatest challenge encountered by regulatory design is probably 
not to be found at the apex of the pyramid of regulatory strategies “where a variety of well-tested 
punitive strategies exist” or at the base of the pyramid, “where there is experience of the successes 
and failures of the free market and of self-regulation in protecting the consumers.”8
As well  as the fact  that  Enforced Self  Regulation is  considered to facilitate a process whereby 
“more offenders would be caught often”, “offenders who are caught are thought to be disciplined in 
a  larger  proportion  of  cases  under  the  Enforced  Self  Regulation  Model  than  under  traditional 
government regulation”.9
In serving as a supplement to self regulation, and probably owing to its acknowledgement of the 
deficiencies  of  self  regulation,  Private  Law  often  „provides  a  model  set  of  rules  to  govern  a 
particular type of transaction.“10 However, such generality and standardisation also constitute the 
root cause of several challenges encountered by Private Law. The generality11 inherent and peculiar 
victims have been granted release from such contracts in certain court decisions. This situation however, is to be 
contrasted to a situation whereby no further exchange of documents occur and the term/duration of the contract is 
simply extended. In such situations, the contractual terms of the originally signed contracts, it would most certainly 
appear, should continue to apply where no further exchange of contracts/documents occur.
6 See H Collins, Regulating Contracts (1999) Oxford University Press at page 63
7 For further information on the benefits, weaknesses of self regulation, as well as other more favourable models of 
regulation, see M Ojo, Co-operative and Competitive Enforced Self Regulation: The Role of Governments, Private 
Actors and Banks in Corporate Responsibility (May 2010) Law and Pro sociality e Journals.
8  I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate Oxford University
Press at page 102; Also see P Grabosky and J Braithwaite Of Manners Gentle: Enforcement Strategies of
Australian Business Regulatory Agencies, (1986) at page 101 Oxford University Press, Melbourne.
9 Ibid at page 114
10 See H Collins, Regulating Contracts (1999) Oxford University Press at page 64
11 „A systematic  problem for  the  efficacy and efficiency of  Private  Law regulation is  attributed  to  its  traditional 
committment to generality in respect of both procedure and substance. With respect to the procedural aspect, Private 
Law tends to apply uniform procedural and evidential rules to govern litigation across the entire range of contractual 
disputes.  This  problem  of  inefficiency  attributed  to  this  approach,  can  partially  be  resolved  through  the 
differentiation of ordinary courts into specialized branches such as a commercial court, small claims courts or courts 
to Private Law distinguishes it from Equity – which looks to the substance of transactions rather 
than the form. Even though it was realised that Equity was required in common law jurisdictions, as 
a supplement to  address the inadequacies  of common law in providing appropriate legal relief, 
Equity in itself, was not self sufficient. However it introduced, through its maxims and application, 
the individuality required in  appropriately awarding what  was just  and appropriate  – given the 
circumstances, to the claimant. In such a way, it mitigated and reduced  the level of standardisation 
and generality that would have existed – had it not been introduced. 
Focus,  once more,  will  be reverted to situations whereby unfavourable and unfair  contracts are 
likely to arise. 
B. Exploitation and Victimization During and After Contract Formation Periods 
Exploitation is regarded as „ a pervasive fact of the social life of human beings, which yet, is also a 
profound evil which tends to infect nearly all their relationships with one another.“12 Even though 
the terms  „victimization“,13 „opportunism“ and „unconscientious  use of power“ are often used 
synonymously with the concept of exploitation,  a distinction can be drawn, as rightly argued,14 
between victimization and exploitation – particularly with respect to their scope. As well as being 
capable of occurring with or without exploitation, victimization constitutes „a wider concept than 
exploitation  –  including  for  example,  „deception“,  „extortion“,  „oppression“,  „entrapment“, 
„manipulation“, and „coercion“ - each of which may be distinguished, to a lesser or greater degree, 
from exploitation.“15
The Role of Legal and Equitable Remedies in Addressing „Exploitation Induced“ Contracts
Such precepts and remedies include:
i)Economic Duress
ii)Misrepresentation of or Mistake in Contractual Terms (this embraces the incorporation of small 
print terms or so called „hidden“ contractual terms)
iii)Unconscionable Dealing
iv)Undue Influence : Inequality of Bargaining Powers
Legal contractual exploitation is considered all the more objectionable when it „occurs within the 
scope of functions, tasks, or relationships that are „fiduciary“ in nature – such exploitation in this 
event being compounded by betrayal, which provides jusitification to administer it separately from 
those more „routine“ instances of exploitation policed by unconscionable dealing.“16
with special expertise in particular types of transactions. 
With respect to the substantive aspects of Private Law, the tendency towards generality in rules again presents 
problems for the efficacy of regulation.“see ibid at page 76  
12 See R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (2003) Oxford University Press at page 1
13 „Especially when combined with self-seeking motives on the part of the alleged victimizer“;ibid
14 See ibid; For further information on compliance and punitive strategies, see also M Ojo, Building on the Trust of 
Management: Overcoming the Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation, SSRN eJournal LAW AND 
PROSOCIALITY and Banking & Financial Services Policy Report, Vol. 30, No. 7, Aspen Publishers/ Wolters 
Kluwer Law and Business, July 2011
15 Interpersonal exploitation, „in abstract terms, is considered to involve the „unfair use“ of another person: taking 
„unjust“ or „unfair“ advantage of another person for one's own advantage or benefit.“ R Bigwood, Exploitative 
Contracts (2003) Oxford University Press at page 20
16 „Legal  contractual  exploitation  involving  betrayal  attracts  equity's  sui  generis  jurisdiction  to  relieve  against 
transactions that result from „relational“ undue influence. Parties able to plead legal contractual exploitation by way 
of relational undue influence are privileged by forensic and remedial advantages not afforded to victims of „mere“ 
unconscionable dealing.“ See ibid at page 24
Should  Implied  Contractual  Terms  Which  Incorporate  Sexual,  Racial  or  other  Forms  of 
Discrimination be Incorporated into Contracts During or After the Formation Such Contracts ?17
Implied contractual terms, which are usually unknown to some parties to an agreement are in need 
of greater regulation than express terms of the contract.  From this perspective, the courts have a 
vital role to play in applying the „Golden Rule“18 of „doing unto others as you would wish to be 
done to you“, as well as other equitable and substantive equality principles and rules applying the 
benchmark of what is considered to be reasonable.
C. Challenges Encountered by Private Law in the Regulation of Contracts: The Need for 
Greater Interaction with Public Regulation
Under  Private  Law,  the  monitoring  of  compliance  with  regulatory standards  of  Private  Law is 
„assigned to the parties themselves, who furthermore, retain the discretion regarding whether or not 
the rules should be enforced or whether to negotiate a revision of such rules or standards“.19
Even though the level of compliance which can be derived from such self- regulatory arrangements 
constitutes the basis of several debates, and even though the Enforced Self Regulation model is 
adjudged to be a better model when considered in terms of flexibility, compliance and enforcement, 
the issue relating to accountability is less contentious and provides robust justification for greater 
interaction between private and public regulation.
As  well  as  questions  relating  to  its  ability  to  foster  an  adequate  level  of  accountability,  other 
identified challenges encountered by Private Law, in the establishment of effective monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms of rules include:20
i)The problem of access to justice. 
ii)Standard setting:  The private  law of  contract,  particularly,  is  lacking in  its  ability to  
„incorporate externalities21 in setting standards; confronted with problems relating to the  
17 For further reading on the extent to which considers the extent to which EC and UK equality law are „moving away 
from liberal notions of non-discrimination towards an approach based on substantive equality or equity, not only in 
the field of sex discrimination but also in respect of race and disability discrimination at a time when the EC is 
expanding its competence in these areas“, see C Barnard and B Hepple, „Substantive Equality“ The Cambridge Law 
Journal (2000), 59: 562-585.
18 The Golden Rule is also to be distinguished from that used in statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation 
involves the application of the Literal Rule, Golden rule, the Rule in Heydon's case or the Mischief Rule. Whilst the 
Literal Rule offers greater legal certainty in comparison to other rules, there is less likelihood of achieving the level 
of legislative intent which could be attained by the other three rules.
19 „No policing and enforcement agency is involved – however, the parties to the contract have the discretionary power 
to enforce the standards through an ordinary court procedure.“ See H Collins, Regulating Contracts (1999) Oxford 
University Press at page 64
20 See R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (2003) OUP at pages 69-77
21 „A fundamental weakness of the private law regulation of contracts consisting in the subordinate role played by 
third parties whose interests may be affected by the self-regulated transaction. Unlike a regulatory regime imposed 
by an agency that is required to consider the interests of all affected parties and other externalities, under the rules of 
private law, the self regulation represented by the contractual agreement does not consider the need to incorporate 
setting of standards with an adequate degree of specificity in order to provide effective  
guidance;
iii)Lack of expertise in choosing standards
D. The Role of Courts: The Need for Legal Certainty and the Reasonableness Test
As  with  statutory  interpretation  which  involves  an  ascertainment  of  legislative  intent  or  the 
remedying of a „mischief“ or defect for which the common law could provide no redress, as well as 
where such legislation appears to be unreasonable, the courts can also play a vital role by „devising 
rules designed to protect interests of disadvantaged parties  whilst disposing of the particular case – 
through for example, the exercise of discretion to imply a default rule as an implied term.“22
In other words, the court could use its discretion in providing supplementary regulation – as regards 
what is to be reasonably implied. There are however limits to when and to what extent the courts 
can exercise discretion. In such situations the need for greater parliamentary powers, as well as the 
role of Parliament in providing greater legal certainty, are often brought to light.
The Need for Legal Certainty and Different Attributions to What is Considered to be Reasonable
The Equitable Case23 highlights the different interpretations which a court could attribute to what is 
considered  to  be  „reasonable.“24 In  Equitable,  the  Administrative  Court,  following  the  stance 
adopted by the Court of Appeal,25  adopted „an unusual definition of unreasonableness, equating it 
with an absence of “cogent reasons” - this being an easier test for a claimant to satisfy than the 
standard of  outrageous illogicality propounded by Lord Diplock in  the leading  case  of  GCHQ 
[1985] A.C. 374.“
Need  for  Legal  Certainty:  Why Should  Certain  Professionals  Be  Accorded  Legal  Professional 
Privilege Whilst Others are Not?
In  R.  (on  the  application  of  Prudential  plc)  v.  Special  Commissioner  of  Income Tax,26 it  was 
ultimately  held  that  „if  there  were  scope  to  extend  Legal  Professional  Privilege  (LPP)  to 
any  spill  over  effects.   Private  Law  lacks  a  clear  mechanism  for  the  interests  to  be  voiced.“  Despite  these 
weaknesses, Collins is of the opinion that Private Law is evolving with the capacity to incorporate considerations of 
externalities in its formulation of regulatory standards and the application of its remedies. 
22 See R Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (2003) OUP at page 71
23  R. Equitable Members Action Group) v. HM Treasury [2009] EWHC 2495 (Admin)
24  „Except in human rights cases, the test for substantive unlawfulness remains that of Wednesbury unreasonableness
—a notoriously high (if imprecise) hurdle for claimants to clear.“ See M Elliot, Cambridge Law Journal, 69(1), 
March  2010,  pp.  1–40,  and  CASE AND COMMENT THE GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE OMBUDSMAN: 
WHAT ROLE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW? at page 2. For further information on the Reasonableness Principle, see 
TR Hickman, „The Reasonableness Principle: Reassessing its Place in the Public Sphere“ Cambridge Law Journal 
14 April 2004 Volume 63 Issue 01 at pages 166-198
25 „The stance adopted  in another Ombudsman case, R. (Bradley) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2008] 
EWCA Civ 36, [2009] Q.B. 114“; see  M Elliot, Cambridge Law Journal, 69(1), March 2010, pp. 1–40, and CASE 
AND COMMENT THE GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE OMBUDSMAN: WHAT ROLE FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW? at page 2
26  [2010] EWCA Civ 1094
accountants,  the  courts  would run into  difficulties  in  determining  the  limits  to  LPP.  Prudential 
offered a number of solutions.27 However, Lloyd L.J. held that the claimant's arguments only served 
to  illustrate  the  complexity of  the matter,  and that  the  extension of  LPP must  be a  matter  for 
Parliament to decide.“ 28
The apparent confusion which arises where courts overrule previous decisions not only contributes 
to  legal  uncertainty,  but  provides  further  justification  for  consolidating  Parliament's  role  in  the 
legislative process.  Another case which provides further  argument for strengthening the role  of 
Parliament, which relates however to accountability, as opposed to legal certainty, is highlighted by 
Elliot by way of reference to the  case of  R. (Equitable Members Action Group) v. HM Treasury 
[2009]  EWHC  2495  (Admin)29 where  the Court,  in  adopting  a  „notably  less  interventionist 
approach“  is  considered  to  have  provided  greater  leeway  for  ministers  to  dodge  their 
responsibilities. 
Roles of the Courts, the Ombudsman and Legislative Bodies in Fostering Accountability.
In view of greater accessibility (to justice) offered by Ombudsmen to weaker bargaining parties, as 
well  as the role they assume in fostering accountability (particularly in holding government/the 
Executive accountable), should courts easily dismiss their findings?
A „strict review of dismissals of the Ombudsman’s findings“, it is added, strengthens the proper role 
of  the  Ombudsman—it  stops  ministers  from evading  political  responsibility  by dismissing  her 
conclusions—while  recognising  that  whether  such conclusions  should  be acted  upon remains  a 
policy question for government and Parliament.  If the latter is unable to bring sufficient political 
pressure upon the former to do the right thing—which might or might not entail doing all that the 
Ombudsman  recommended—then  that  is  a  further  argument  for  strengthening  the  role  of 
Parliament.“
27  „Prudential  challenged  notices  requiring  the  production  of  documents  relating  to  tax  advice  given  by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. The thrust of Prudential’s argument was that, as accountants routinely give legal advice 
regarding fiscal  matters,  Legal  Professional  Privilege (“LPP”) should apply.  Its  first  argument  was that  LPP is 
concerned with the function of giving legal advice, not the status of the adviser. Its second argument was that as LPP 
is a common law rule the courts could extend it. Lloyd L.J. asserted that this depends upon whether Parliament has 
left that option open.Prudential’s last argument related to the Court of Appeal decision in Wilden Pump Engineering 
Co  v.  Fusfeld  [1985] F.S.R. 159.“  K Hughes,   Case and Comment ACCOUNTANTS ARE NOT LAWYERS: 
LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE, ACCOUNTANTS AND THE TAX MAN The Cambridge Law Journal 
(2011), 70 at page 20
28 See K Hughes,  Case and Comment ACCOUNTANTS ARE NOT LAWYERS: LEGAL PROFESSIONAL 
PRIVILEGE, ACCOUNTANTS AND THE TAX MAN The Cambridge Law Journal (2011), 70: 19-21
29 See  M  Elliot,  Cambridge  Law  Journal,  69(1),  March  2010,  pp.  1–40,  and  CASE  AND  COMMENT  THE 
GOVERNMENT  VERSUS  THE  OMBUDSMAN:  WHAT  ROLE  FOR  JUDICIAL REVIEW?  at  page  3.  R. 
(Equitable Members Action Group) v. HM Treasury [2009] EWHC 2495 (Admin): „The Ombudsman is empowered 
to  make findings  of  maladministration  and  can  recommend what  should  be  done in  the  light  thereof,  but  the 
Government is under no statutory obligation to accept what the Ombudsman says. Whether this means that, as a 
matter of law, ministers are wholly free to dismiss the Ombudsman’s reports was the question in this case.“
E. Why Harmonisation on the Basis of a Common European Code of Ethics and Conduct 
which  is  Founded  on  Substantive  Equality  Principles  May  Achieve  More  Effective  and 
Satisfactory Results than the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR).
This paper, whilst highlighting the confusion and lack of legal certainty which could be attributed to 
common law systems, might appear to infer a preference for the codification of rules. However as 
will be illustrated in this section, whilst common law cannot be regarded as the ultimate contributor 
to legal certainty, a common system of codified rules is also incapable of introducing an optimal 
level of legal certainty.  If  more superior and higher ranked legislation such as statutes are still 
capable  of  generating  confusion,  and  if  courts  still  have  the  liberty  to  refrain  from following 
important legislations such as the Human Rights Act,30 could legal certainty ever be achieved?
The Restatements were regarded by some to be a model for the Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR),  a  means  of  achieving  a  common  background  and  benchmark  in  respect  of  different 
jurisdictional  laws  –  given  the  fact  that  such  Restatements  were  „  generally  regarded  as 
authoritative  reference texts  which  provide  the  basis  for  law school  courses  and for  doctrinal 
discussion, and which are applied by the courts as if they had the force of statutes.“31
 
The  lack  of  clarity  and confusion  attributed  to  the  DCFR,  in  its  role  to  clarify  the  confusion 
attributed  to  common law,  as  well  as  its  inability  to  contribute  to  legal  certainty,  have  raised 
questions about its suitability to serve as a model which could provide the benchmark required in 
achieving the required level of legal certainty.32 
30  „In R. (on the application of Prudential plc) v. Special Commissioner of Income Tax, Lloyd L.J. rejected the HRA 
argument  –  on  the  basis  that  whilst  Article  8  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  protects 
communications with lawyers, it does not protect communications with other professionals providing legal advice, 
and even if it did, the limits of LPP could be justified under Article 8(2). He also rejected the argument advanced 
under Article 8 coupled with  Article 14 ECHR, concluding that if there is any discrimination it “is not on the basis 
of the status of the person enjoying the right, but of the person to whom he wishes to turn to get advice” See K 
Hughes,  Case and Comment ACCOUNTANTS ARE NOT LAWYERS: LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE, 
ACCOUNTANTS AND THE TAX MAN The Cambridge Law Journal (2011), Volume 70 Issue 1 at page 21
31  See N Jansen and R Zimmerman, “A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE IN ALL BUT NAME”: DISCUSSING THE 
NATURE AND PURPOSES OF THE DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE Cambridge Law Journal, 
69(1), March 2010 at page 101
32 „The Restatement project was about establishing authoritative texts contributing to legal certainty; and that means 
that it was about rule-making. At the beginning of the 20th century the common law was generally seen to be in a 
desolate condition. As a result of countless contradictory precedents and laws it had become completely unclear and 
confusing, even for professional lawyers.„See ibid. „According to Schulte-Nolke, the Restatements are supposed to 
provide  “a  method  to  establish  commonalities  against  the  background  of  diversity  of  laws”  in  Europe. 
Qualifications, as located by Jansen and Zimmerman, in Dicey’s work, which are also considered, to a greater 
extent, to be necessary in the DCFR, were sought for  in vain. See ibid at page 102
CONCLUSION
The Private Law of Contract would immensely benefit from an approach which involves greater 
interaction with public regulation as well as one which incorporates substantive equality principles. 
Whilst  implied  contracts  are  considered  to  present  the  greatest  threats  and  challenges  in  the 
achievement  of  a  greater  level  of  legal  certainty,  the courts  could assist  in  helping to  mitigate 
ambiguities arising from such contracts by supplementing such contracts with rules which should 
not only be reasonably implied, but which should also take into account the principles of Equity or 
substantive equality. Furthermore, Parliament and other legislative bodies have a role to play in 
ensuring that a greater level of legal certainty is achieved.
As illustrated in the paper however, the reasonableness test is not so straightforward and may differ 
depending on individual cases and circumstances. Whilst this certainly doesn't introduce the degree 
of legal certainty which may be desired, it goes on to illustrate the fact that the achievement of a 
lower level or a lower degree of legal certainty may be the price for adopting more bespoke and 
individual based approaches to cases. Despite this, the overweighing justification to be considered 
when adopting such approaches, should be that justice has been served to whom it is due and to 
whom justice should serve.
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